Abstract
Introduction 1
To investigate the relationship between truth and utility in Bentham's thought is to investigate the relationship between the faculty of understanding and the faculty of will, since, to abbreviate outrageously, the understanding is governed by truth, and the will by utility. So interpreted, an obvious answer emerges to the question of this paper.
Sentient beings act, react, and indeed think in response to a natural desire for pleasure and aversion to pain:
Every operation of the mind, and thence every operation of the body, is the result of an exercise of the will or volitional faculty.-The volitional faculty is a branch of the appetitive faculty: i.e. that faculty in which desire, in all its several modifications, has place. Desire has for its object either pleasure or pain, or what is commonly the case a mixture of both in evervarying and unascertainable proportions. 2 Thought is not only laborious, and thereby painful, but difficult, and is therefore only rationally explicable in terms of an anticipated pay off in pleasure experienced or pain avoided. In the absence of the motivational impetus of pleasure and pain-without, that is to say a desire for utility, not necessarily general utility, since personal or sectional utility will serve-the acquisition of accurate knowledge about the world, that is of truth, is, to multiply yet further the number of fictitious entities already deployed in this single paragraph, an effect without a cause. What is of interest to human beings is that which constitutes a source of pleasure or pain to them. For Bentham, the foundational principle of rationality is that the sensation of pleasure is to be preferred to that of pain. Is this principle true? Not perhaps analytically or logically, but Bentham is confident that, whether we engage in introspection or observation, we will quickly encounter an abundance of empirical evidence in its favour, and an 1 A version of this paper was presented in December 2011 at 'New Directions in Bentham Studies: An International Symposium' at UCL Laws. I am grateful to the participants in the symposium for their comments, and would like to express particular thanks to Xiaobo Zhai and Philip Schofield for their wisdom and their patience in the face of repeated queries on the subject of truth and utility. Their insights have saved me from many errors and misunderstandings, while those which remain are mine. but that simply reflects the facts that language is only the only instrument by which humans can communicate any assertions, and that that instrument necessarily misdescribes the world. Thus, with Bentham, 'Coaeval with the very first steps that can be taken in the endeavour to give a clear explanation of the true nature of language must be the intimation given of the distinction between real and fictitious entities, and the correspondent distinction between names of real and names of fictitious entities.' 13 That is to say, there are two parallel distinctions, not one, and those distinctions match up precisely in the sense that names of fictitious entities designate things which do not exist, whilst names of real entities designate things which do. For Bentham reality, like its synonym existence, 14 is a fictitious entity, a quality ascribed in language to things which exist: 'Of every other entity, real or fictitious, either existence or non-existence is at all times predicable. Whether such other entity be real or fictitious, its existence is of course a fictitious entity'. 15 The origins of language in the denomination of particular objects set a pattern which human beings in their continuing encounters with the physical world generalized in developing the spectacularly useful capacities for abstraction and generalization.
Identification and organization of observed regularities facilitated prediction, but the expression of those regularities in abstract terms introduced confusion into thought about what was real and what was not.
11 'Logic', UC ci. 340 (Bowring, viii. 262 ). 12 B.S. Jackson, 'Bentham, Truth and the Semiotics of Law', in Current Legal Problems 51 (1998), 493-531, at 498. 13 'Universal Grammar', UC cii. 462 (Bowring, viii. 331 ). 14 See UC cii. 14 (De l'ontologie, p. 174 (Bowring viii. 196 )): 'Whatsoever claim an object belonging to the class of bodies may be considered as possessing to the attribute of reality, i.e. of existence, every object belonging to the class of perceptions will be found to possess a still better title'. 15 'Ontology', UC cii. 74 (De l'ontologie, p. 150 (Bowring, viii. 210) ).
In every species of knowledge, disorder in language is at once the effect and the cause of ignorance and error. Nomenclature can only be perfected in proportion as truth is discovered. It is impossible to speak correctly, unless we think correctly; and it is impossible to think correctly whilst words are employed for registering our ideas, which words are so constituted that it is not possible to form them into propositions which shall not be false. 16 Nevertheless, any demand to eliminate fictitious entities from language, so that it might simply reflect the world, is a demand that the human capacity to communicate verbally be reduced to the level of animals unable to form abstract concepts, unable, that is, to think in general or abstract terms. § I. Truth and the names of real and fictitious entities.
What then, distinguishes names of real entities from names of fictitious ones? The name of a real entity designates 'an entity to which, on the occasion and for the purpose of discourse, existence is really meant to be ascribed'. 17 Bentham is less than clear in his treatment of the category of real entities, but for the most part he is ready to admit to that category two sorts of things, namely real physical entities on the one hand, which are particular substances (that is, essentially, things or animals), 18 and, on the other, certain psychical entities (that is sensations, 19 of which our experience and observation suggests that all animals are capable, and impressions and ideas, 20 the capacity for which, according to our experience and observation, varies between 16 'View of a complete code of laws', Bowring, iii. 171. 17 De l'ontologie, p. 164 (Bowring, viii. 196) . 18 See 'Preparatory Principles Inserenda' (henceforth 'PPI'), UC lxix. 241; 'Logic', UC ci. 341 (Bowring, viii. 262) . 19 Notably, of course, pain, pleasure, which in combination with will, perform all the heavy lifting in making sense of abstract legal and moral words: see 20 See Chrestomathia (CW), p. 271 n; 'Logic', UC ci. 347 (Bowring, viii. 267 ); UC ci. 417. Ideas, for Bentham, are present to memory, that is, are formed by recalling the images which constitute the impressions deposited by real entities. He also asserts simultaneously in at least one passage, however, (Chrestomathia (CW), 'Appendix IV', p. 265-6 n.) that general ideas are fictitious entities, and that they are real entities, so long as they produce 'mental images'. I think this passage has to be disregarded, since, if this were Bentham's considered position, not only would, for instance, 'obligation' arguably qualify as a real entity-since propositions containing that word call to mind archetypal images of real entities-but so would the purely imaginary combinations of images of real entities which Bentham designates as fabulous entities-since the idea of a golden mountain, for instance, definitely produces a mental image in the mind.
animals, with human beings set apart by their facility for forming and exchanging the latter) to which encounters with real physical entities give rise in the sensate subset of real physical entities.
It is the facility for forming and exchanging ideas, or, in a word, language, which gives rise to the designation of things which do not, in fact, exist. 'A fictitious entity is an entity to which, though by the grammatical form of the discourse employed in speaking of it existence is ascribed, yet in truth and reality existence is not meant to be ascribed.' 21 Bentham's assertion is that the names of fictitious entities, that is, crudely, abstract terms, 22 were originally simply borrowed from those of real entities, while the connection with the original images has been lost or forgotten.
Propositions featuring fictitious entities as subjects, strictly understood, had no referents in the real world, made no assertions about the real world, and were therefore, in and of themselves, either meaningless or false. The key to making sense of such fictitious names, to asserting and exchanging truth in relation to them, lay in possibility of their connection with the names of real entities, in their explication in terms of real entities:
A proposition having for its subject the name of a fictitious entity is not clearly understood any further than as it can be translated into a correspondent proposition having for its subject the name of some real entity. Falsehood, then, or nonsense, is the only import, of which, abstractedly from all relations to any proposition having for its subject the name of some real entity, a proposition having for its subject the name of a fictitious entity is susceptible. thus, be seen to be divisible into two parts, the real and the fictitious. And throughout the whole mass, it is in the real part that the fictitious will be found to have its necessary root.' 27 Bentham's techniques for connecting fictitious entities with real ones will be discussed further below, but, for the moment, let us return to the relation between real entities and truth.
Bentham assumes at the outset not only that the world which we perceive exists, but that sense experience is capable of delivering accurate information about it.
The basis for accepting these assertions is twofold. In the first place, our only source of information or evidence indicates its accuracy. In the second, while that source of information may actually be deceptive, the consequences of accepting the evidence of sense are incomparably better than those of rejecting it:
I assume, in a word, the existence of what is called the material world. ... I assume it boldly for this reason; because in point of practice, no bad consequences can, as every one is ready to acknowledge, possibly arise from supposing it to be true; and the worst consequences can not but arise from supposing it to be false.
28
It should be noted that the criterion which very quickly determines the validity of the existence of the external world is entirely utilitarian and pragmatic. How do we know 24 'Universal Grammar', UC cii. 456 (Bowring viii. 329 that the evidence we perceive in the sensations we experience is reliable? In short, we do not and cannot, since that evidence is the only kind available to us. Bentham concedes to Berkeley equally speedily that since our evidence for the existence of the material world comes only through sense, it would be strictly accurate to describe sensations as the only real entities, with physical objects possessing merely an inferential reality, but immediately proceeds on the basis that physical objects do exist.
At this level, utility, the demand that we prioritize the pursuit of welfare, wins out over seeking the truth in relation to a question which, given the informational constraints of human existence, we simply cannot answer.
A further central premise utilized by Bentham is that reality is binary: things either exist or they do not:
Down to this present time-whatsoever be this present time-whether the time of writing it or the time of any one's reading it-whatsoever has existed has had existence; whatsoever has not existed has not had existence: at this present time, whatsoever does exist has existence; whatsoever does not exist has not existence: and so at any and every future point of time.
29
Bentham repeatedly asserts that it is possible to exchange not only sense, but truth, in propositions which relate to the names of real entities. 'By every name of a real entity ... is held up to view an object really existing, an object in relation to which Encounters with physical real entities deposited impressions via our sense organs-the images created by those impressions being recallable at leisure-and, very often, those encounters also produced sensations of pain or pleasure. Bentham is careful to caution that the correspondence between perception and reality will not be entire; we can err in our interpretation of sensory data, since our knowledge of the external world depends not simply on passive perception, but active judgment:
'Scarce does a perception take place, but it is accompanied ... with a corresponding judgment or act of the judicial faculty.' 32 While a fuller discussion appears in § IV below, it should be noted at this point that Bentham is well aware such judgment very often relies on a cognitive frame through which it imposes order on an otherwise chaotic world, and that large elements in that frame are purely mental constructs, fabrications of the imagination.
33
The subjects of our most primitive communications were real physical entities, to which reference was aided by the links between the entities, the names we gave them, and their ideas, or mental images. Such designation, the beginning of both language and logic, became embedded in the structure of language and thought, so that 'a material image is the only instrument by which, the only medium through which, conceptions can be conveyed from mind to mind'. 34 To exchange sense through words is to exchange pictures, mental images, which correspond to states of real entities past, present or future. which an entity belonged, and then adducing a specific difference from other members of the same genus-offers no great help, since many fictitious entities have no superior genus. Since their bare names deliver neither truth nor meaning, to exchange meaning we must focus on propositions, which combine a name, a copula, and a predicate, which two latter combine to attribute to the name some quality or property. 38 Hence the first move in any analysis of fictitious entities is phraseoplerosis, or, in short, the embedding of the name to be analysed in a proposition. Having done that, we move on to paraphrasis, wherein the proposition is replaced by another which comes closer to real entities. We continue until we reach a proposition which refers to nothing but real entities.
39
According to Bentham, these techniques for expounding fictitious entities in terms of real entities permit the exchange of both meaning and truth in relation to fictitious entities. If they prove unavailing, if no substitution of a proposition of which the subject is a real entity to a proposition of which the subject is a fictitious entity is possible, the name in question names nothing, and no proposition of which it is the subject can be true or meaningful. However, where such substitution can be made,
Bentham is clear that truth can be expressed. As he notes with reference to propositions employing the fictitious entity obligation: 'it ought to be possible to decipher such language into the language of pure and simple truth-into that of fact.
To understand abstract terms, is to know how to translate figurative language into language without figure'.
40
Bentham provides us with a formal paraphrasis of neither truth nor utility, though he comes much closer with reference to the latter. Here, the real entities which supply meaning and truth are the sensations of pleasure and pain. As Bentham puts it:
38 Bentham subsequently appears to have decided that the copula of itself could not indicate existence, and that, therefore, a fourth element, a sign of existence (in short, a verb) was necessary to complete a proposition: see 'Universal Grammar', UC cii. 170, 494 (Bowring, viii. 337 Bentham explicates place itself with reference to the concept of space, understood as the absence of body, which he regards as possessing simultaneously elements characteristic of both a real and a fictitious entity, and which he designates finally as semi-real. 45 It seems that the completion of our investigation of motion might now be in sight, in that having reached space, whether a fictitious entity of the first order (that is one that is explicable solely with reference to real entities) or a semi-real entity (partaking to some extent in reality), we are very close to real entities. Bentham says that 'place is a relative portion of space, considered either as actually occupied or as capable of being occupied, by some real entity of the class of bodies'. 46 The final hint supplied by Bentham is that motion 'can no otherwise be defined than by diversity of distance'. 47 A body (real entity) is in motion when the distance between it and another body, or relative point in space is changing. Since distances between bodies will equally vary if either moves whilst the other does not, we have a potential problem in ascribing motion to the right body. By standing still, I move relative to the club in your hand, until my head comes into violent collision with it! Bentham recognizes that, to the best of our knowledge, all bodies are, in an absolute sense, in motion, but asserts that relative rest will serve for all earthly purposes. 48 We might then escape our confusion by using the notion of relative space, relative that is in having, just like a body, boundaries, and dimensions. 49 only occur over time, we can, in a real sense, only assert motion retrospectively, by reference to variation in distance.
Before attempting to complete our paraphrasis, we need to address the remaining problematic fictitious entity, namely existence, which 'is in every real entity: every real entity is in it'. 50 Bentham notes the connection between existence and the verb substantive, that is the verb 'to be': 'There is but one simple Verb and that is the verb substantive: the word of which the function is to designate existence, to whatsoever subject attributed.' 51 Whereas all other verbs involve the assertion that some quality exists in some subject, the verb to be alone asserts the simple fact of existence, of being. In fact, says Bentham 'the import [of] every verb other than a verb substantive is resolvable into the import of the verb substantive added to the import of a noun adjective.' 52 Having got this far, we have drained the analytical well:
existence is correctly predicated of real entities which do indeed exist.
It is high time to return to our paraphrasis of truth, noting only that the idea of existence, like those of motion and rest, presumes the ideas of both place and time:
No state of things can have been in existence but in some place and some time,-in some portion of the field of space, and in some portion of the field of time.
Place and time are, accordingly, both of them adjuncts to all existence.
Existence is a field or ocean which spreads itself at once over both these subjacent fields, the field of space and the field of time. We have eliminated motion, rest and existence, but have, of necessity, imported time and space, while we have taken refuge in the ontological core of the verb 'to be', in an attempt to capture the essence of truth as correspondence with reality. This last move reveals the point at which purely logical analysis runs out of steam, so that we end up no great distance from the starting point of all correspondence theories of truth. In other words, the truth asserts that that which is, is, and that that which is not, is not. § III.
Criteria of Truth
Since not all assertions which relate to real entities, directly or indirectly, are true, the central problem for human beings who wish to exchange meaningful and accurate information about the world is the nature of the criterion by which we differentiate between existence and non-existence, and between motion and rest. would, I think, dissent from the implication that that which is is 'not true'. Both thinkers are entirely prepared to accept that the world exists independently of human actions or language, and for both truth is a human construct, a fictitious entity which human beings ascribe to propositions. However, the difference remains that, for
Bentham, truth is correctly ascribed precisely to things which come and are, and not to things which do not come and are not. As will be noted below, James himself, for the most part, rejects the idea that subjective human will can render any old assertion true.
For Bentham, the tool both for forming true propositions about the world and for testing them is, of course, Baconian induction. Individual bodies existing in nature are perceived by sense, while knowledge advances gradually by the observance of conformities between events, and by the successive experimental elimination of circumstances observed to attend natural events in particular instances, to exclude those only contingently connected to the event. However, Bentham is careful to avoid appealing to the fictitious entities causation or law of nature in describing the results: 55 See, for instance, James, 'Pragmatism', pp. entities. Instead, 'Necessity, Impossibility; Certainty, uncertainty; Probability, improbability; actuality, potentiality;-whatsoever there is of reality correspondent to any of these names is neither more nor less than a disposition, a persuasion of the mind, on the part of him by whom these words are employed, in relation to the state of things ... to which these qualities are ascribed'. 71 When I assert that I am certain about something, I share more information about me than I do about that thing.
Given that 'actuality' features in both Bentham's enumerations of the fictitious qualities concerned with existence, it is striking that truth itself is excluded, particularly since the attempt to paraphrase the term took us directly to existence.
Indeed, if we were to include truth as one of the modifications of existence to which
Bentham's stricture applies, we would end up with an anticipation of modern deflationary theories of truth. What I communicate by asserting the truth of statement
x is my internal persuasion that statement x corresponds to reality, that is, my acceptance of its content. Deflationary theories of truth take a similar tack, in rejecting the notion that truth is a property of propositions, and proposing instead that 'truth talk is expressive (enhances the expressive powers of our language) rather than descriptive'. 72 Ayer too argues that 'in all sentences of the form "p is true", the phrase "is true" is logically superfluous', so that 'the terms "true" and "false" connote nothing, but function in the sentence simply as marks of assertion and denial'. 73 For
Bentham, the immediate subject of all propositions is indeed the state of the speakers mind, of his beliefs, but propositions concerning real entities also communicate information about the world. The ascription by speakers of truth to propositions certainly tells us about the state of the speakers mind; the question is, does it add any meaningful information to the proposition?
Bentham himself certainly asserts that truth is potentially predicable of propositions whose subject is a real entity. If this is the case, truth actually does double duty, indicating both something objectively meaningful about the correspondence between the proposition of which it is predicated and the world, and something subjectively meaningful about the belief of the speaker. between something being true and something being necessary', 74 there is a difference between true and necessary propositions, which is that true propositions present images deposited by real entities, and in so doing 'correspond' to the facts of the world, whereas necessary propositions arise out of, and are entailed by, the analytic, tautologous premises of a range of formal systems which are themselves the product of imagination, of the active human capacities for invention and for the organization of information. In short, no object is necessary, but all objects are capable of existing or not existing. Such formal systems, which include branches of mathematics and indeed language itself, deal with subject matter which is wholly fictitious, and are The faculty of will, however, is governed by pain and pleasure, and there are resources available to the will to be deployed in clouding the understanding, which boil down to the decision to look the other way, that is, ignore or disregard inconvenient evidence. Bentham's discussion of the range of methods for looking the other way is strikingly similar to Peirce's analysis of flawed methods for attaining the fixation of belief, that is, of rendering belief unassailable by doubt. 83 Tenacity (simple refusal to consider evidence to the contrary), authority (refusal to think on the ground that someone else has done it for us), and the a priori method (that is, begging the question by assuming the truth of the contested premise in the construction of the enquiry) would all look very familiar to Bentham, with the latter two especially receiving extended discussion in his discussion of political fallacies. 84 Postema notes that the condition for universal agreement in relation to the assessment of a body of evidence depends on the existence of 'universal cognitive competence'. 85 At times, Bentham assumes just such a capacity, though at others he analyses the internal factors which prevent its achievement. In presenting what he calls 'pragmatic epistemological realism', Habermas provides an echo of Peirce's definition of truth as that which would be believed after exhaustive enquiry.
Habermas draws attention to external, rather than internal, obstacles to consensus, central to which are inequalities of power. Truth then emerges as the quality of propositions which would be adopted as a result of fully inclusive, uncoerced participation in dialogue aimed at mutual understanding: 'Accordingly, a proposition is true if it withstands all attempts to invalidate it under the rigorous conditions of rational discourse.' 86 Whilst presenting a rather more reductionist account of the conditions of rational discourse, Bentham has the same sort of image in mind when he argues that publicity is a necessary condition for worthwhile political debate: 'It is the characteristic of error to possess only an accidental existence, which may terminate in a moment, whilst truth is indestructible'. 87 Error is accidental in the sense that it remains open to correction by access to fuller evidence, while the indestructibility of truth refers at once to both the binary nature of existence (things either did exist or they did not), and ability of true propositions to withstand criticism.
As noted above, for Bentham it possible to speak the truth in propositions concerning fictitious entities, insofar as they can be interpreted as 'the intended and supposed equivalent ... of-some proposition having for its subject some real entity', insofar, that is, as they can be translated from necessarily figurative language into language without figure, into the language of 'fact'. Indeed, the language of truth is simply the language of fact, where fact is defined as 'The existence of any expressible state of things, or of persons, or of both, whether it be quiescent or motional or both, at any given point or portion of time'.
88
The paraphrasis of obligation in terms of the real entities pain and pleasure achieves precisely this connection to the language of truth or of fact. Similarly, the explication of the obscure fictitious entity 'title' in terms of 'dispositive events', eliminates the figurative in favour of the factual: 'To say that an event has happened, is to speak the language of simple truth-is to announce a fact which presents an image to the mind-it is to present a picture which could be painted'. 89 The reason facts are facts is that they are in principle testable, that observation, experiment and experience can provide evidence of their falsity or truth, and that the best available evidence indicates the latter rather than the former. If I wanted to make assertions capable of truth as well as falsehood, I needed to refer to facts, and this was as true of However, to endorse utilitarianism as against asceticism and the principle of sympathy and antipathy requires two further moves which do not themselves depend on facts, but upon specifically moral premises. The first move, which consists in accepting what Bentham thinks is the foundational principle of rationality, namely that pleasure is preferable to pain, serves to see off asceticism. The second, which consists in accepting the egalitarian moral premise that the legislator has no reason for preferring the happiness of one individual to that of another, debars the sympathist/antipathist from prioritizing the welfare of those to whom he is welldisposed as against that of those to whom he is ill-disposed. Bentham makes both moves, though the second is never expounded at length. 95 He would assert, I think, that the sympathist/antipathist will simply not be able to adduce any facts from which to derive his substantive moral premises, whilst any attempt so to do will perforce oblige him to engage in what is, in effect, utilitarian reasoning. § IV. Bentham, pragmatism and fictionalism.
Lee contrasts Bentham's inductivist position ('although utility informs the direction and search for truth, truth is not defined in terms of utility') with that of William James ('truth is simply reduced to utility'). 96 universal desire to pursue pleasure and avoid pain informs our search for truth, in that our exploration of the external world is guided by interest: 'Knowledge is established through an interplay of truth and utility, of the nature of the agent with its particular type of sense organs and interests on the one hand, and the world at large within which such agent is operating on the other.' 97 For his part, James would not dissent from this statement, and it appears that the alleged difference between the two men consists in the status of the knowledge thus acquired, which for Bentham 'is real, not arbitrary and dependent on the subjective will of the agent. That fire burns is true not simply because it is useful; it is true, and it is useful in so far as it is true.' 98 However, the implication that James thinks that fire burns simply because it is useful constitutes, to say the least, a considerable misrepresentation of James's position.
The importance to human life of having true beliefs about matters of fact is a thing too notorious. Ideas that tell us which of them to expect count as the true ideas ..., and the pursuit of such ideas is a primary human duty.
The possession of truth, so far from being here an end in itself, is only a preliminary means towards other vital satisfactions. … since almost any object may some day become temporarily important, the advantage of having a stock of general extra truths, of ideas that shall be true of merely possible situations, is obvious. … Whenever such an extra truth becomes practically relevant to one of our emergencies, it passes from cold-storage to do work in the world, and our belief in it grows active. You can say of it then either that 'it is useful because it is true' or that 'it is true because it is useful.' Both these phrases mean exactly the same thing, namely that here is an idea that gets fulfilled and can be verified. True is the name for whatever idea starts the verification process, useful is the name for its completed function in experience. . 105 These logical forms are emphatically fictitious: 'The differentiation of the chaos of sensations into "thing and attributes", into "whole and parts" etc, is a purely subjective achievement', 106 with no basis in reality. Indeed, fictions, in imposing order on chaos, not only contradict reality but are self-contradictory. However, since the role of thought is not to reflect reality but to manipulate it, the legitimacy of a fiction depends not to its truth but, as for the pragmatists, on its usefulness, 'on the 103 Bentham too is acutely aware that in their efforts to describe the physical world, human thought, and its instrument language, actively construct a purely mental model of the world. He recognizes that basic categories of human thought (matter, form, quality, quantity) are indeed fictitious entities. If we want to exchange meaning about fictitious entities, the easiest way is to speak as if they were physical objects, even though this is a misdescription. It is this metaphorical substantification of the immaterial which gives rise to confusion, since it is seen everywhere in language, whether in the constructions 'in motion', 'at rest', or in the naming of properties or qualities: apples exist, many apples are ripe, but ripeness is a fictitious entity which we locate in ripe apples. 109 The logical analysis by which 'ripeness' is first abstracted from a real apple, then designated as a noun substantive in its own right, and then attributed to other similarly coloured objects itself abounds in fictions, false propositions about the world, since ripeness relies on the existence of real objects in which it might inhere, and has no independent existence. Bentham certainly anticipates Vaihinger in regarding many of the basic categories with which thought seeks to understand the world as fictitious entities. 110 However, while they both regard qualities as fictitious, for Bentham, the particular bodies to which qualities are 107 Ibid., p. 3. 108 Ibid., p. 68. See also Bentham's extended parable of the way in which thought deconstructs (analyses) external reality in creating logical, but fictitious qualities, and then reconstructs (synthesises) it, in accordance with concepts and the organization thereof, which are its own, fictitious, invention (Chrestomathia (CW), 'Appendix IV', pp. 261-73), which recognizes that, even in the description of real entities, thought alters reality by imposing classificatory schemes and concepts which are the product of human artifice.
attributed are impeccably real. 111 For Vaihinger, conversely, there is no thing apart from its qualities, while both are equally fictions. 112 The question is, are these constructivist elements in Bentham's thought sufficient to render him a fictionalist?
For Vaihinger, as for James, good theoretical models produce accurate predictions of observational and experimental data, so that the criterion of a good model is entirely pragmatic: good models are good guides to action. 113 However, the theoretician and the model-builder know very well that the abstract concepts which feature in the theory have no basis in reality, while 'the fiction is the acceptance of a statement or a fact although we are certain of the contrary'. 114 C.K. Ogden, who edited Bentham's writings on logic, also translated Vaihinger's major work, and not only appears to endorse fictionalism, but asserts that Bentham had anticipated the central elements of that philosophy. 115 However, Vaihinger himself makes no reference to Bentham's logic, and his discussion of Bentham is limited to a brief consideration of whether the latter viewed the assumption that all human motivation was self-interested as a fiction-a self-consciously false but useful idea-or as an hypothesis-an empirically testable assertion-while he concludes that Bentham failed to appreciate the difference between the two. 116 Conversely, for Lee, Bentham's inductivist epistemological commitment to correspondence between sensation and reality ensured that he was no more an anticipator of Vaihinger than he was of James.
On this account, Bentham simply refuses to abandon the search for facts: 'What is true has its basis in reality or may be said in some way to be a reflection of it.' 117 Vaihinger then, is thought to err in jettisoning the idea of truth understood as correspondence to external reality. paraphrasis for the rehabilitation of fictitious entities: they can be justified by necessity (we simply cannot speak without them), and by utility (they allow us to calculate right answers to problems which were previously insoluble).
A final example of the proto-fictionalist Bentham might be advanced in his statement that 'A body (real entity) is an aggregate of fictitious entities. Bodies (Real entities) are distinguishable by the fictitious entities (properties) they are known to be made up of'. 124 Postema interprets this passage as recognition that we change the world in perceiving it. 'In short, the sensory manifold is "decomposed" into a large number of notable fictitious entities. Hence, the real concrete object (or its sensory impact on the mind) is, from the point of view of the active mind, an aggregate of fictitious entities.' 125 There is, however, a more minimalist interpretation which, while recognizing that the active mind's deconstruction and reconstruction of the real concrete object is indeed motivated by the pragmatic desire for well-being, insists that nothing in that mind's operation prejudices the reality of real entities. On this view,
Bentham's statement is better interpreted as one more repetition of the distinction between bodies, which are real, and their qualities, which are the fictitious creations of that active mind, where fictitious means simply non-existent in the absence of any real entities in which to inhere.
According to Rosen, Bentham is 'clearly some sort of fictionalist about his theoretical invocations of fictitious entities. These claims (though theoretically convenient and possibly "indispensable") are not strictly true'. 126 However, Bentham may not qualify as a fictionalist proper, because he does not appear to subscribe to the proposition which forms the 'distinctive commitment' of fictionalism, namely that 'the ultimate aim of discourse in the area is not (or need not be) to produce a true account of the domain, but rather to produce theories with certain "virtues"-virtues a theory may possess without being true'. 127 The central virtues of theory are explanatory power, capacity to unify and organise observational data, and, crucially, Paraphrasis rehabilitates fictitious entities precisely by eliminating the falsehood-the assertion that the fictitious entity has real, independent existence-involved in propositions which contain them.
There are two major problems with the fictionalist interpretation of Bentham. reference to that which exists), and an equally significant gain in utility, since, in this sphere at least, truth and utility stand or fall together.
Ultimately, it is the rooting of utility in the real entities of pleasure and painthat is to say the exposition of the fictitious entity utility in terms of alleged facts which are themselves capable of empirical verification or falsification-which makes utility useful: it is the only acceptable moral principle because (discounting asceticism)
it is the only moral principle whose alleged dictates are capable of truth or falsehood.
In morals at least, then, Bentham would endorse Lee's reading that there can be no conflict between truth and utility because only the true can in fact be useful: 'Any construct, which itself does not refer to a real entity and is not reducible to others which do, is bound to lead to disutility.' 132 For Bentham, whilst the value of true
propositions is indeed to be subjected to utilitarian evaluation, the very possibility of utilitarian evaluation itself depends on the existence of such things as true
propositions. The chicken of utility and the egg of truth are very likely, therefore, to remain forever locked in a mutually supporting embrace. § V. The useful versus the true
As Russell points out, in order to tell whether truth and utility go together we need to be able to tell them apart, that is, we need an independent criterion of truth.
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Whatever might be said of William James, Bentham does distinguish between the two, and can therefore meet this challenge. The question is, to which fictitious entity does
Bentham cleave when they conflict? On the one hand, as noted above, there is no doubt that for Bentham, the foundational principle of rationality is that the sensation of pleasure is to be preferred to that of pain. On the other, for the most part, accurate knowledge about the world is precisely what underpins our predictions of the pleasant or painful consequences of particular actions. However, if experience were to indicate that being guided by truth, that is, by the best available approximation to an accurate description of reality, issued in increased pain, in comparison with being guided by error, that is by a description of reality which we know to be mistaken, it might be rational to embrace error in preference to truth.
Although this strategy might be utility-maximizing, it is, as has been noted, impossible for us simultaneously to attend fully to the relevant evidence and to 132 Lee, The Legal-Rational State, p. 204.
believe in assertions plainly contrary to that evidence. However, it has also been noted that human beings are capable of wilful failure to attend to evidence. In addition, the question arises most urgently when we are in possession of truths and make decisions not to share them with others. Generally, utilitarian lies arise from the desire to refrain from inflicting avoidable pain. In a scenario where serious harm would clearly be avoided by lying-for instance in answer to the enquiry from the vicious criminal about the whereabouts of his intended victim-a utility calculation would almost certainly indicate that deliberate falsehood was at least justifiable, if not obligatory.
For Bentham, the value of veracity as a virtue depends, like the value of all virtues, solely upon its consequences: 'no act can with propriety … be termed virtuous except in so far as in its tendency it is conducive to the sum of happiness'.
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According to this criterion, there can be no doubt that, in general, veracity has overwhelmingly good consequences in terms of utility. Indeed, 'The habit of veracity is one of the great supports of human society-a virtue which in point of utility ought to be, and in point of fact is, enforced in the highest degree by the moral sanction.'
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While it may be the case that particular falsehoods might be useful, every particular falsehood contributes to undermine the habit of truth-telling. The reason that veracity is so crucial to society is summed up by Bentham as follows:
Happiness, in almost all its points, is, in every individual ... more or less dependent on knowledge; the word knowledge not being on this occasion confined in its application to the knowledge of those recondite facts which belong to the domain of science. But in all cases, except that of a life carried on from beginning to end in a state of perfect solitude, knowledge depends in the largest proportion upon testimony: and ... it is only in so far as it is expressive of truth, that testimony is productive of knowledge.
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In other words, we take an awful lot of knowledge on trust: 'At every moment of our lives, we are obliged to build our judgments, and to direct our conduct, upon the knowledge of facts, of which there are only a few that can pass under our own observation.' 137 The important question for the utilitarian legislator, given that very few of us, if any, possess the leisure and the skill necessary to evaluate the evidence supporting all the assertions which we take for granted, is whether it is justifiable for the legislator to mislead us for our own good, whether, that is, 'Government house utilitarianism' is a rational methodology of government. 138 Whilst recognizing the value of transparency on impeccably Benthamic grounds, Lazari-Radek and Singer argue that utilitarians are in principle obliged to follow Sidgwick in endorsing esoteric morality, that is to say, in recommending duplicity in relation to cases where lying has the best utilitarian consequences, and we can be confident that the truth will not emerge. 139 In so far as Hooker's ruleutilitarianism rejects such an esoteric morality, it is held to have abandoned consequentialism altogether. 140 Bentham would, I think, accept the logic of Sidgwick's position, but would believe that the condition of maintaining secrecy reduces to a minimum the number of cases in which such a morality might be called into action. Remember, 'no act can with propriety … be termed virtuous except in so far as in its tendency it is conducive to the sum of happiness'. To rule out duplicity always and everywhere simply is to reject the calculation of the probable consequences of an action. However, Bentham's empirical answer to the question of 'Government house' utilitarianism is both tolerably clear, and defensible. In general, the strategy will not work, because the lie will be discovered. The evidence of sense perception is available to all, and the factual evidence is available to all. Of course, all human beings, being subject to sinister interest, interest-begotten prejudice and adoptive prejudice, are liable to engage in fallacious reasoning in order to carry a point, but fallacious reasoning is detectable.
Bentham allows himself to flirt briefly with misinformation in his analysis of punishment, where he draws a distinction between the real and the apparent value of a punishment. The real value is the pain which the offender actually suffers, whilst the apparent value is that which the watching public believe him to suffer. Bentham asserts that by exploiting the property of exemplarity, which increases the apparent punishment, the value of the real punishment may be reduced:
It is the idea only of the punishment (or, in other words, the apparent punishment) that really acts upon the mind; the punishment itself (the real punishment) acts not any farther than as giving rise to that idea. It is the apparent punishment, therefore, that does all the service, I mean in the way of example, which is the principal object. It is the real punishment that does all the mischief.
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Whilst the obvious way of increasing the apparent punishment is by increasing the real, there are, says Bentham, less expensive-meaning less pain inflicting-means, one of which consists in 'a particular set of solemnities distinct from the punishment itself, and accompanying the execution of it'. 142 It is tempting to indulge in a happymeaning less pain inflicting -fantasy, wherein, to impress the public, the judge dons his black cap, and performs a ritual condemnation of the offender, perhaps to suitably grave musical accompaniment, before the offender is led behind a screen to begin his minimally painful actual punishment, part of which involves the obligation to scream at the top of his voice in simulation of acute pain. 143 Of course, such a fantasy breaches Bentham's first rule of proportion, which is that the punishment must outweigh the expected profit from the offence, but it does so only in relation to the tiny minority of the population who are actually convicted of offences. With respect 141 IPML (CW), p. 178-9. 142 Ibid., p. 179. 143 A similar readiness to delude public perception is evident in 'Rationale of Punishment', Bowring, i. 429-31, where Bentham considers means of enhancing the exemplarity of the punishment of imprisonment. He proposes three grades of prison, the third reserved for delinquents 'never to mix with society again'. 'Here let the apparent condition of the delinquent be as miserable, and the real as comfortable, as may be.' The prison reserved for the worst offenders should be painted black, whilst skeletons should be displayed on either side of the door, in a way calculated to excite in the imagination of inmates, but more especially in that of visitors, 'the most salutary terrors'. 'I am fully aware, that to the man of wit these emblematic figures may serve for matter of ridicule: he admires them in poetry; he despises them when embodied in reality. Fortunately, however, they are more assailable by wit than by reason.' to them, the legislator seems to have forfeited the ability to influence their future behaviour in a good way, although a credible threat that any repeat offence would be followed by a severe dose of real pain might do the trick. However, Bentham explicitly notes that deterrence of potential offenders through example is far and away the most important end of punishment 'in proportion as the number of persons under temptation to offend is to one', 144 whilst that deterrent effect depends not on the real punishment, but precisely on the apparent punishment.
A more serious objection to the policy is that public knowledge of the disjunction between the real and the apparent punishment would eliminate the disjunction, thereby destroying the desired exemplary effect, and bringing the entire justice system into disrepute, while the relevant point is that the public would be very likely to find out. We might prolong the fantasy by imagining 'Offender protection programmes', under which, in order to maintain the secret, our compliant offender and his family are secretly relocated and equipped with a new identity, but setting aside any issues of cost, the overwhelming likelihood is that the secret would leak, and our brilliant scheme to economise on suffering would fail.
In his writing on Indirect Legislation, Bentham responds to an objection that rewarding informers is wrong, because it constitutes public incitement to breach of trust (in effect, lying), and breach of trust is always wrong:
The proposition then that to violate promises is immoral, if given as an universal one is not true.
There are cases in which the violation of a promise is not immoral: and this is one of them. But it may be said, admitting this distinction to be just in itself, is it such an one as the people will enter into? The case, let it be admitted, is one that ought to be regarded as an exception to the rule. But will the people actually regard it in that light? Here, the legislator makes a public declaration of the utilitarian rationale of the rule which rewards information leading to the prevention or detection of crimes, and engages with the public concerning the utilitarian justification for lying to people who trust us. Now the rule that informers will be rewarded is a public rule, and, like all public rules, it requires a rationale, and that rationale, for Bentham, can come only that those sanctions will not be applied, that is, I will be spared punishment. Of course, whether coming clean will have the best consequences overall, as well as offering me a possible escape from sanctions, will itself depend on the probable consequences of so doing.
Errors in popular perception, false beliefs on the part of the ruled, do present the legislator with the problem of how far he ought to attempt to correct them. For instance, the general psychological tendency to optimism had already been noticed by 145 'Indirect Legislation', UC lxxxvii. 54 (Emphasis added 147 and, according to the latest researches of neuroscientists, remains alive and well. 148 Since this Micawberish fantasy is a delusion, ought the legislator to attempt to combat it, even at the cost of eliminating thereby a large quantity of pleasure, since pleasure derived from the contemplation of erroneous beliefs is no less real than pleasure derived from the contemplation of true beliefs? The answer depends on two judgments, the first concerning the consequences of the prejudice in terms of pleasure and pain, and the second concerning the consequences of any attempt to correct it. In relation to the first, it might be argued that irrational optimism has good consequences in both the short and the very long term, but might have bad consequences in the medium term. Thus my current expectation that things will turn out well supplies pleasure as long as it lasts, while its prevalence might provide evidence of its being an evolutionary advantage.
Conversely, Bentham was alarmed by the widespread pains consequent upon the tendency, particularly prevalent among the poor, of failing, during the youthful years of relatively high wages and low outgoings, to make any provision for old age. He certainly thought it conceivable that the benefit of avoiding these pains could justify the legislator in levying compulsory pension contributions to make provision for old age.
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In relation to the second, Bentham considers the means available to the legislator in combating popular prejudices, and concludes that they reduce to patient instruction. 150 Given that existing prejudices are data relevant to the utilitarian calculation, it is hardly surprising that Bentham subjects any measure which opposes them but which would, in itself, be useful, to utilitarian calculation: 'the measure is still to be put into execution, if the good of it to them promises to be greater than the evil of their dissatisfaction at the thought of it.'
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In general, Bentham appears confident that the dissemination of knowledge will lead to a gradual reduction in the gap between both public perception and reality (or rather the best currently available approximation thereto), and between public opinion and the dictates of utility. He is not opposed to public funding of enquiry in the pursuit of knowledge, or indeed of the public funding of the dissemination of factual information, but is profoundly hostile to the publicly funded dissemination of particular conclusions. Once again, the particular target he has in mind is the established church, which he believes to be the disseminator of falsehoods. In so far as Bentham believes the religious sanction to play a positive role in supporting acceptable moral standards, there is a tension here between the utility of religious belief, and the lack of evidentiary basis for that belief. The tribute to religion as possessing important utility in supplying the deficiency in the legislator's power 'by inculcating upon the minds of men the belief that there is a power engaged in supporting the same ends, which is not subject to the same imperfections', 152 is revealed as the statement of Dumont rather than Bentham, but Bentham himself made an equivalent statement in IPML. 153 Despite this, the vast bulk of Bentham's discussion in 'Délits religieux' consists in the denunciation of the offences of religion, in fostering belief in an afterlife where most of us are damned to eternal suffering, and shifting our focus away from the real world of experience, which is the only proper context for the sanctions of reward and punishment. 154 The other surviving discussion which does place religious belief in a positive light, in 'Rationale of Reward', also appears in a work edited by Dumont, and so comes attached with a considerable caveat. That said, the discussion puts the question as to whether the utilitarian legislator ought to make an exception to the prohibition on providing rewards for the avowal of the truth of particular opinions:
It may be said, that an exception ought to be made from the rule, in cases wherein, on whichever side the truth may be, the utility is clearly on the side thus favoured. Thus there is use, for instance, in the people's believing in the being and attributes of a God: and that even in a political view, since upon that depends all the assistance which the political can derive from the religious sanction: and that there can be no use in their disbelieving it.
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The discussion goes on to admit that insofar as such a belief is indeed useful, it certainly requires to be taken into account. However, given the disutility arising from the state's embrace of hypocrisy, in publicly asserting the truth of assertions without factual basis, and thereby fostering mendacity and devaluing veracity, the strong likelihood is that the costs of such a policy will outweigh the benefits, at least that seems to be the most plausible interpretation of the hesitant and ambiguous conclusion: 'If, then, the interests of religion be at variance with those of virtue, and it be necessary to endanger the one in order to promote the efficacy of the other,-so then must it be.' 
